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Argentina privatized most public utilities during the 1990's but re-nationalized the main water company
in 2006. We study beliefs about the benefits of the privatization of water services amongst low and
middle income groups immediately after the 2006 nationalization. Negative opinions about the privatization
prevail. These are particularly strong amongst households that did not benefit from the privatization
and amongst households that were reminded of the government's negative views about the privatization.
A person's beliefs of the benefits of the water privatization were almost 30% more negative (relative
to other privatizations) if his/her household did not gain access to water after the privatization. Similarly,
a person's view of the water privatization (relative to other privatizations) was 16% more negative
if he/she was read a vignette with some of the negative statements about the water privatization that
Argentina's President expressed during the nationalization process. Interestingly, the effect of the vignette
on households that gained water is insignificant, while it is largest (and significant) amongst households
that did not gain water during the privatization. This suggests that propaganda was persuasive when
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A small but growing literature has emphasized the connection between beliefs and economic 
organization. For example, the amount of redistribution observed in the US and Europe, or 
the amount of market reform that we can expect in developing countries, appear to be 
connected with voter‟s beliefs about actors (or elements) of the  economic  system. Two 
dimensions of these beliefs are particularly important: their variability and their accuracy. 
Indeed, if these beliefs are fixed, perhaps because they are culturally/historically determined 
or because of people‟s incentives to preserve and invest in “collective ideologies” do not 
vary, then the possibility of changing economic systems or of implementing long lasting 
market reforms will be limited. And if these beliefs can diverge from reality there is of course 
the possibility of large welfare losses. Indeed, one question that has confronted this research 
is the extent to which beliefs can be maintained in the face of available evidence to the 
contrary.
1 A natural question deals with both dimensions and asks the extent to which an 
agent (perhaps an “ideological entrepreneur”) can persuade others of a particular point of 
view using old or fabricated data. In other words, we ask whether there are conditions under 
which propaganda is effective in changing people‟s beliefs; and to what extent differences in 
reality affect the impact of propaganda.  
 
To attempt an answer to this question, we study the formation of beliefs concerning the 
benefits of privatizing the main water company in Argentina during a period where the 
government  made  several  attempts  to  persuade  the  public  of  its  negative  views  on  the 
private company, an effort that we call propaganda. Specifically, in June 2006 (three months 
after the nationalization) we implemented a survey to elicit views about the 1990‟s market 
reforms in general and the water privatization in particular. It covered households living in 
middle and low income neighborhoods in the outskirts of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Two 
“treatments” were studied: the presence or not of firm investment and the presence or not 
of propaganda. Using detailed historical maps indicating which households had access to 
                                                 
1  For explanations and evidence see, inter alia, Denzau and North (1994), Piketty (1995, 1998), Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, (1998), Bowles (1998), Bisin and Verdier (2000), Benabou and Ok (2001), Alesina, Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (2001), Hall and Soskice (2001), Johnson (2002), Rotemberg (2002), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002), 




water services, we ensured that about half the usable addresses in the sample had gained 
water during the privatization while the other half remained without access at the time of the 
survey. We then reminded a (random) group of our sample of some negative statements 
made by President Kirchner concerning the lack of investment of the water company around 
the time of the nationalization (exactly as it was reported in the press). As a control, a 
statement that was made by the water company defending their record on investment was 
read to another sub-sample. The statement made by the President referred to a fact and was 
ostensibly untrue, and this was particularly evident to those that had gained water as a result 
of the company‟s investment. Thus, we can evaluate the impact of propaganda across two 
sub-samples that had experienced different “realities”.  
 
Our  approach  exploits  several  features  of  this  episode.  First,  the  policy  in  question 
(privatization)  is  salient  to  voters.  Privatization  of  state  owned  companies  was  a  key 
component  of  the  market  reforms  of  the  1990‟s.  They  have  been  widely  and  regularly 
discussed  by  commentators  in  the  media  and  are  central  to  the  positioning  of  political 
parties. The incumbent government has repeatedly discussed publicly the problems of the 
privatizations and the March 2006 nationalization of the water company made the specific 
issue we focus on particularly salient to the public. Second, the privatized water company‟s 
investment during the 1990‟s brought water services to a large group of people. Since the 
ensuing  water  charges  were  significantly  lower  than  what  households  were  paying  for 
substitute services, we have a group that is unambiguously and significantly better off in 
material terms with privatization. This group can be compared to the group that remained 
unconnected to the water services. Third, the firm that was the target of the attack was 
foreign owned, which increased the receptiveness of the public to the President‟s attacks. 
Fourth,  during  this  episode  the  President  gathered  support  for  the  nationalization  by 
personally  attacking  on  repeated  opportunities  the  water  company  in  the  media  and  in 
political rallies for lack of investment.
2 Thus, we have one concrete example of a political 
agent trying  to affect people‟s beliefs about the privatized water service. This is helpful 
because,  rather  than  designing  a  piece  of  information  that  we  think  might  work  as 
                                                 
2 A foreign investor that arguably did well economically in the privatizations of the 1990‟s, which were often 
perceived to be quite corrupt, has several of the characteristics that Glaeser (2005) identifies as facilitating the 
acceptance of hate-creating stories by the public. De Marzo et al, (2003) show that the repeated nature of the 
attacks may help persuasion.  
 
3 
propaganda, and devising a setting in which there is a presumption that propaganda might be 
useful, we obtained the content and setting of our piece of propaganda from the real political 
“market”.  The  repeated  nature  of  the  president‟s  public  statements  against  the  water 
company matches the episode with one theoretical dimension of propaganda campaigns. In 
other words, our empirical exercise uses an actual situation where propaganda was deemed 
useful  (by  an  agent  who  has  been  successful  in  the  political  market)  and  one  set  of 
statements that were actually used as propaganda.  
 
We find that the 1990‟s market reforms are unpopular, receiving relatively low scores (on a 
1-10  scale).  The  average  score  for  the  privatizations  is  3.07,  and  it  is  somewhat  higher 
amongst relatively poor households. We define Water Score Gap as the score for the water 
privatization minus the score for all the privatizations (see the appendix for data definitions). 
We find that Water Score Gap is positively correlated with having gained water. The effect is 
large: those that gained water rate the water privatization over all the privatizations by 0.91 
points, or a gain of almost 30% over the average score for all the privatizations. The effect 
of  propaganda  is  also  large:  those  that  were  reminded  of  the  statements  made  by  the 
President against the water company score it 0.49 points lower, or a drop of almost 16%. 
There is no discernible effect of reading the statement made by the company. Interestingly, 
the negative effect of reading the president‟s statement on beliefs is bigger (approximately 
double)  when  the  household  did  not  gain  access  to  water  during  the  1990‟s  and  is 
insignificant when it did. Our interpretation is that propaganda requires at least some basis in 
reality to have an effect (on people‟s beliefs). 
 
Our  paper  is  connected  to  prior  work  on  the  formation  of  beliefs.
3  The possibility of 
persuasion was the focus of earlier work outside economics, although the effects found were 
often described as “minimal”.
4 As described in a classic paper by Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 
                                                 
3 See, inter alia, Hochschild (1981), Inglehart (1990), Shiller et al (1991), Ladd and Bowman (1998), Schotter 
(1998),  Alesina,  Glaeser  and  Sacerdote  (2001),  Luttmer  (2001),  Corneo  and  Gruner  (2002),  Fong  (2001), 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2007), Alesina and Giiuliano (2008), Landier 
et al (2008) and Aghion et al (2008). See also Earle et al (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1994) for early work on 
support for privatization 
4 See Nisbett and Ross (1980) for a classic account of how circumstances affect judgment. There is, of course, 
important work on persuasion and mass media in political psychology (see, for example, Milburn, 1991, Zaller, 
1992,  McGuire,  1985,  and  Cialdini,  2001).  For  a  discussion  and  the  relationship  to  the  rest  of  political 
psychology, see Jost and Sidanius (2004), who cite work by Mullen et al (1986) showing a positive correlation  
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(1982), “Four decades ago, spurred by the cancer of fascism abroad and the wide reach of radio at home, 
American  social  scientists  inaugurated  the  study  of  what  was  expected  to  be  the  sinister  workings  of 
propaganda in a free society. What they found surprised them. Instead of a people easily led astray, they 
discovered a people that seemed quite immune to political persuasion. … later research on persuasion drove 
home the point repeatedly: propaganda reinforces the public's preferences; seldom does it alter them (e.g., Katz 
and Feldman 1962; Patterson and McClure 1976; Sears and Chaffee 1978).” Accordingly, research 
moved away from persuasion and towards the possibility of other effects of the media (for 
example, towards the study of agenda setting).
5  
 
Work in economics on the subject focuses on the possibility of using information, perhaps 
strategically,  to  affect  people‟s  beliefs.
6  Recent  work  takes  a  broader  perspective.  For 
example, Glaeser (2005) provides a model where citizens are persuaded to hold a negative 
point of view about particular groups. Citizens‟ willingness to be persuaded by hate-creating 
stories depends on the costs and benefits of acquiring information and on the existence of 
an out-group that is perceived to be influential politically but socially segregated. Theoretical 
work on the media, for example, describes which pieces of news will be more persuasive. 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) argue that it will be those that agree with viewers prior 
beliefs, while Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) argue that reputation is important because it will 
be messages emitted by media outlets that share the viewer‟s political inclination that will be 
judged to be more reliable. There is also previous work on the possibility that persuasion is 
easier to attain using categorical thinking and metaphors (as in Mullainathan and Shleifer, 
2006, and Lakoff, 1996) or when social networks are important (see, for example, De Marzo 
et al, 2003 and Murphy and Shleifer, 2004). Note that if we detect persuasion when using a 
simple  untrue  fact,  it  is likely  that  less  blatant  forms  of  persuasion  (which  for  example 
involve fewer patently untrue statements) can be employed successfully to affect people‟s 
beliefs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
between the frequency of smiles by a TV news anchor when reporting on one of two presidential candidates 
(Reagan) and favorable viewer attitude towards Reagan. See, in particular, the review by Petty and Wegener 
(1998), who remind us of a long experimental tradition to the study of attitude change in social psychology 
going back to the 1930‟s, which points out that the effects depend in large part to situational factors (they cite 
the work of Knower, 1935). 
5 One example is Iyengar et al‟ (1982) itself, where they studied the effects of media exposure using random 
assignment in a lab setting. They presented one set of volunteers with a standard news program while another 
is shown an edited version with stories on other issues (using older material from the same station). They 
found that news coverage can affect evaluations of the importance of different issues (agenda setting). 




Two recent papers in economics have presented convincing evidence of how certain types of 
coverage affect voting behavior. Such a connection can arise because a particular coverage 
convinces viewers that some problems are more important than others, favoring candidates 
that  emphasize  those  issues  (agenda  setting).  Or  it  can  affect  voting  because  coverage 
convinces a viewer to change his or her mind (persuasion). For example, DellaVigna and 
Kaplan (2007) show that areas in the US were the cable operator offered Fox News Channel 
observed voter turnout increases relative to other areas where Fox did not enter, as well as 
increases in the Republican party vote share in Presidential elections. In a related spirit, 
Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2008) designed a field experiment to measure the effect of 
exposure to newspapers on political behavior in Washington DC. They randomly assigned 
households (that were not receiving newspapers up to then) to receive copies of either a left 
or a right leaning newspaper and later surveyed them. They found that those treated with the 
left-leaning newspaper were up to 8 percentage points more likely to report voting Democrat 
than  the  control  group  (although  no  significant  difference  was  found  with  the  group 
receiving  the  right  leaning  newspaper).  The  Gerber  et  al  paper  is  particularly  interesting 
because they attempt to provide evidence of persuasion versus agenda setting. In one section 
of their paper they switch attention from voting for a candidate to a battery of questions on 
specific issues. These include three questions on which the newspapers might be expected to 
differ in their coverage: one that is factual (how many troops died in Iran?), one that informs 
them of a fact and asks them for an evaluation (was it wrong or not for members of the 
Bush administration to disclose the identity of a CIA agent?) and one that was normative 
(should the Senate confirm Bush‟s nominee -Judge Alito- to the Supreme Court?).
7 They 
find a significant shift in reported opinions in the thir d question (the Alito case), with the 
                                                 
7 The three questions used by Gerber et al (2008) are:  
1.  As you may know, members of the Bush administration have told reporters the identity of a woman 
working for the CIA. From what you have heard or read about this matter, which of  the following 
statements best describes your view –a)  some Bush administration officials did something illegal; b) no 
Bush administration officials did anything illegal, but some officials did something unethical; or c) no 
Bush officials did anything seriously wrong. 
2.  As you may know, President Bush recently nominated Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. Based on 
what you have heard or read, do you think the U.S. Senate should confirm Alito; not enough is known 
about Alito and the Senate should gather more information; or the Senate should not confirm Alito's? 
3.  About how many American soldiers have died in the Iraq war since it began in 2003? a) 1000 or fewer, b) 
More than 1000 but fewer than 2000, c) more than 2000 but fewer than 10,000, or d) more than 10,000?  
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expected sign. Our paper is also an attempt to isolate the effect of persuasion as it links 
misinformation on a specific issue with an opinion about that issue.  
 
Section  2  provides  a  brief  historical  description  of  the  privatization  and  subsequent 
nationalization of the  main  water company in Argentina.  It also describes our data  and 
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our main results while section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Historical Description, Data and Empirical Strategy  
 
2.a. The Privatization and Re-Nationalization of the Water Service in Buenos Aires 
Argentina undertook a comprehensive set of market reforms during the 1990‟s that included 
a  fiscal  and  monetary  program  that  pegged  the  exchange  rate  and  dramatically  reduced 
inflation. It also featured a broad privatization program, which included the transfer of, 
amongst others, the national telephone company, the post, the national airline, oil, water and 
sanitation,  electricity  and  gas  sectors.  The  largest  water  company  privatization  was  the 
concession in 1993 of the public company Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN), which 
provided service in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. It was awarded to Aguas Argentinas, 
a private consortium lead by the French company Lyonnaise des Eaux. The terms of the 
concession  stipulated  construction  plans  to  expand  the  water  network  to  100%  of  the 
households and the sewage network to 95% of the households by the end of the 35-year 
concession. They also established service quality and waste treatment standards. The Buenos 
Aires  water  privatization  did  not  imply  significant  price  increases  (figure  1  shows  the 
evolution of prices). There was however an increases in the rate of collection of water bills 
and an eventual renegotiation that reduced the original price reductions.
8  
 
Economists have published studies suggesting that the priv atization of the Buenos Aires 
water company increased investment in the sector improving efficiency and productivity (see 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo, 2000, Alcazar, Abdala and Shirley, 2002 and Galiani, 
                                                 
8 For a general discussion on the evolution of tariffs under privatization in Latin America see McKenzie and 
Mookherjee (2003), and for the Argentine case see Alcazar et al (2002), Gerchunoff, Greco and Bondorevsky 
(2003), Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2003), and Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005).  
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Gertler and Schargrodsky,  2005). Several case  studies show  large  increases in  water and 
sewage  production,  reductions  in  spillage,  increases  in  tariff  collections  and  significant 
service enhancements (summer water shortages almost disappeared, repair delays shortened, 
and water pressure and cleanliness improved). These service improvements came together 
with  a  reduction  in  almost  half  the  number  of  employees.  The  employment  reduction, 
together  with  the  increase  in  coverage  and  production,  resulted  in  large  productivity 
increases.  Investments  were  particularly  important  in  terms  of  increased  access  to  the 
network.  More  than  2,000,000  people  gained  access  to  the  water  service,  and  about 
1,240,000 people obtained connections to the sewage network.
9 
 
This network expansion resulted in three distinct groups wit hin the population: one where 
people were already connected to the network before privatization, a second group with 
people that gained access after the privatization, and a third group that remained without 
access throughout. Of these groups the second wa s the one that made the biggest gains 
because their monthly expenditures on water fell significantly, besides the considerable 
convenience of the water and sewage connection.
10  
 
A crucial aspect, for our purposes, is the investments made by the company. We  confirmed 
such investment, and the corresponding expansion in the network, through several sources: 
the company, the reports made to the regulatory agency (ETOSS) and their subsequent 
statements to several legal entities (including congress), newspaper reports, changes in access 
to services reported in census data and other surveys (see Galiani et al., 2005). We take this as 
evidence that in reality the company made significant investments. This notwithstanding, at 
the time of the crisis in 2002, more than 15 percent of the metropolitan population remained 
unconnected to the water network, while more than 40 percent still lacked access to the 
sewage network. A large fraction of the population that lacks access is located in the poorest 
neighborhoods of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.  
 
                                                 
9 Dividends paid to the shareholders of Aguas Argentinas up to the economic crisis of 2002 amounted to 5% of 
equity. In that year no dividends were announced. There are obviously indirect ways of extracting surplus (e.g., 
transfer prices), but explicit accusations on this issue have not figured prominently in the press. 
10  Galiani,  Gonzalez-Rozada  and  Schargrodsky  (2008)  report  significant  reductions  in  household  water 
expenditures associated to network expan sions, as connected families are able to substitute piped water for 
more expensive and distant sources of water provision.  
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Interestingly, in 2006 water privatization was not popular according to opinion polls. This 
was neither a particular characteristic of the water privatization nor particular of Argentina. 
Opinion polls and press articles report widespread discontent with privatizations in general 
in Latin America (IDB, 2002; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003). This was accentuated by 
the  full  blown  macroeconomic  crisis  of  2001-02,  which  led  to  the  devaluation  of  the 
exchange  rate  in  January  2002  and  the  government  default  on  its  debt.  Evidence  from 
Latinobarometer, for example, suggests that the percentage of respondents that disagreed 
with the idea that privatizations had been beneficial for the country increased from close to 
49% in 1998, to approximately 68% in 2000, while in 2002 this number stood at 85% (see, 
for example, Shirley, 2004). Interestingly, this evidence also suggests that privatization was 
more popular amongst low income households (in fact the evidence reported in Shirley, 
2004, suggests disapproval of privatization is monotonically increasing in income -at least for 
levels  of  income  typically  included  in  surveys  which  includes  low  and  middle  income 
respondents). While the blame for the crisis was repeatedly placed on the rigid monetary 
arrangements and the fixed exchange rate, the popularity of all market reforms suffered. 
 
Until 2001, water charges were pegged to the dollar. Under the law of economic emergency 
of  2002  (Law  25.561),  water  charges  were  unilaterally  frozen  and  converted  into  pesos. 
Political tensions soon arose when the company requested that an increase of the water 
charge  be implemented  in  proportion  to the  increase  in  the  peso cost of the  dollar, as 
stipulated in the contracts. The company also sued the Argentine Government in the ICSID 
(international  arbitration  tribunal)  for  a  total  of  U$1,7  billion  for  not  allowing  fee 
adjustments. As the privatized companies halted their investments, some interruptions to the 
water services were reported in the news during the summer of 2003-04.  
 
The  government  responded  applying  a  U$1,3  million  fine.  This  was  followed  by  the 
President of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, publicly attacking the water company on January 
23, 2004, citing lack of investment and non-compliance with the terms of the concession 
contract. Obviously, these events were widely reported in most newspapers as well as in 
radio and TV programs. Later that year, however, on May 11, it was announced publicly that 
the government and the company had reached a deal where a) the company would suspend 
the complains to the international arbitration tribunal, b) the government would suspend the  
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application of fines, c) the company announced investments for a total close to U$80 million 
for 2004, and d) there would be tariff increases after 2004 (which eventually was never 
allowed). This led President Kirchner to publicly praise the company that same day, citing it 
as  “an  example”  to  other  privatized  company  “who  seem  to  be  deafer”.  The  President  also 
“thanked France” for their help during the negotiations.  
 
Less than one  month after the  2004 agreement had expired,  the  President attacked  the 
company for requesting a “60% increase in prices”. During 2005, President Kirchner and the 
minister for Public Works carried out a series of verbal attacks on the company that were 
again widely reported in the media. On March 22, 2006 the water concession to Aguas 
Argentinas was finally cancelled.
11  See Figures 2 and 3 for a graph of the frequency of 
newspaper articles on the Water Company and summary of some of the statements made by 
the President against the water company.   This helps put into context our propaganda 
intervention: it is a marginal message within an extremely large campaign, involving messages 
on many types of media (newspapers, radio, TV as well as speeches in political gatherings) 
and involving top political officials (the President, the key ministers as well as other officials), 
lasting many months. We do not have data on the costs of putting together such a 
generalized campaign to affect people‟s beliefs but we suspect it can be quite large.
12 
 
2.b. Data Description 
We administered a survey in June 2006 to 560 households that had been living in the same 
house (not apartment buildings) since before 1993. The survey used random replacement 
and covered households in middle-low and low income neighborhoods in the outskirts of 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. An important feature of our design is that, using detailed historical 
maps of water service access, we ensured that about half the sample gained water during the 
privatization while the other half remained without access throughout the 1990‟s until the 
                                                 
11 Besides Aguas Argentinas, a small subset of the companies privatized during the 90s has returned to the hands 
of the National Government hands after the collapse of the convertibility plan. Examples include the mail 
service, the public purchase of shares of the national airline company, and the creation of a new public energy 
company. 
12 Data on advertising on a particular media (e.g., the price of a newspaper ad with “information” on the Water 
company) would not be useful because the propaganda messages in question appeared in the information 
section of the newspapers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such “communication strategies” are available 
through some media outlets, they are virtually impossible to organize involving all media outlets simultaneously 
(and are likely to be prohibitively costly).  
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2006 nationalization and up until our survey. Our questionnaire  confirmed  water access 
status. In the survey we elicited beliefs about the benefits of several market reforms that 
took place during the 1990‟s. Tables 1a and 1b  present a basic description of the data. 
Opinions about the market reforms in our sample are quite negative, with an overall score of 
3.75 out of ten (although it should be noted that our sample excludes the top half of the 
income distribution where more support is to be expected). Of course these numbers do not 
have a natural interpretation, but as a mild anchor we note that in the educational system in 
Argentina a 4 is an undistinguished note (although enough to pass some exams in secondary 
school and most in university).  
 
In order to present our study of the effect of propaganda, we discuss two “treatments”, 
namely  the  effect  of  firm  investments  on  the  beliefs  about  the  benefits  of  the  water 
privatizations, and the effect of government propaganda on the same outcome. Table 1a 
provides the scores for the sub-sample that gained water and the sub-sample that remained 
without water. It reveals that the No Water sub sample gives a higher score to the reforms of 
the 1990‟s (4.06 versus 3.44) and the privatizations (3.35 versus 2.79), but a lower score to the 
water privatization (3.35 versus 3.82). Similarly, in Table 1b the sample is split into a group 
that  received  the  government  propaganda  treatment,  a  second  group  that  received  the 
information provided by the company, and a control group. The group that was read the 
government statement about the water company gives a somewhat lower score to the water 
privatization (3.33) than the group that was read the company statement (3.68) or the control 
group (3.59). 
 
Obtaining access to the water network for a family living in a certain location is not under its 
control. As explained above, the concession terms stipulated a set of construction plans that 
were needed in order to expand the water network to 100% of the households, one of the 
objectives of the 35-year concession. These expansion plans explicitly pre-defined the timing 
of  arrival  of  the  water  network  to  each  area  (see  Aguas  Argentinas,  2001).  Although 
exogenous, failure to receive water is correlated with location and, thus, potentially with 
income and other factors that might be connected to ideological position in this setting. 
Therefore, simply comparing the score given to the water privatization across sub-samples  
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will give us a biased view of the extent of support for privatization.
13 It is therefore of 
interest to compare the distribution of household characteristics amongst our respondents. 
Tables 2a and 2b present the raw data. 
  
Table  2a  focuses  on  the  characteristics  of  households  that  gained  water  during  the 
privatization. In our sample, the data suggests that 84% of head of households without 
access to water are classified as unskilled, while only 77% of those with access to water are 
unskilled. The difference is statistically significant. The head of households without water 
also appear to be younger (5 years on average), poorer (or at least with lower scores on the 
Socioeconomic Index) and are more likely to be the respondents to the survey, possibly 
because more of them do not have steady jobs. All of these differences are stat istically 
significant. In brief, Table 2a suggests that the two groups (those that gained water and those 
that remained without water) are different on several dimensions that we could measure. 
There is no reason to believe that all the dimensions over which these two groups differ are 
measurable,  so  comparing  means  across  the  two  groups  will  remain  unconvincing. 
Fortunately, one approach that allows us to get around the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity is to differentiate the data by subtracting the sco re for other privatizations 
from the score given to the privatization of water ( Water Score Gap). These differentiated 
scores are uncorrelated to all the observables that we can measure, as will become clear later 
on (from the insignificant coefficients on these observables in a Water Score Gap regression in 
Table 3). Accordingly, a reasonable assumption is that other dimensions that we did not 
measure are also uncorrelated with the gap. 
 
The second treatment concerns government propaganda. This was implemented through the 
use of vignettes, read to the respondents during the interview, before the question on water 
privatization but after the questions on overall reforms and privatizations.  Three groups 
equal in size were randomly defined: the sub-sample being read a “President Vignette”, the 
sub-sample being read a “Firm Vignette”, and a control group. We collected all newspaper 
reports that referred to the nationalization of the water company. The main argument for 
                                                 
13 The simple comparison of means of water score for the middle-income and the poor will underestimate the 
effect  of  investment  on  support  for  privatizations  because  the  former  are  typically  more  negative  on  all 
privatizations (this is a common finding in Latin America; see Shirley, 2004).  
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nationalization, as stated by the government, was the firm‟s failure to invest to expand the 
coverage and improve water quality. This was repeated in several occasions.
14 Accordingly, 
we selected a statement related to the firm‟s investment from the main speech by the main 
actor  in  the  pro  nationalization  camp  (the  President).  For  the  firm  vignette,  we  simply 
collected the firm‟s statement reacting to this accusation.  
 
Table 2b presents the raw data for the three relevant groups. The first column presents the 
means for the group that was not read any of the two vignettes. It shows that 83% of the 
control group was classified as unskilled. The second column shows the difference with the 
group read the President vignette and the third column shows that the result of a t-test 
suggests that the difference is not statistically significant. Column 4 presents the difference 
between the mean for the control group and the mean for the sub-sample being read the 
firm vignette. The last column in Table 2b (column five) shows that a t-test of this difference 
is also not significant.  The only variable where there is a statistically significant difference 
between the control group and one of the treatment groups was age, where those reminded 
of the firm propaganda were five years younger than the control group. Note that those 
reminded of the President‟s views are 2 years younger than the control group (t-statistic is 
only 1.4), so it seems that it is the control group which seems to have abnormally high age. 
Given that it is in only one attribute, and that the absolute size of the difference seems small, 








                                                 
14 Nazi leader Joseph Goebbels emphasized the repeated aspect of successful propaganda campaigns. In his 
writings there are also examples of factual lies. For example, in April 1945 he explains that the Allies are close 
to collapsing and that “A happy outcome for us depends wholly and exclusively on ourselves.” The article was called 
“Kämpfer für das ewige Reich”, and it was published in Das Reich, 8 April 1945. From the German Propaganda 
Archive, accessed on July 1st, 2008. See Petty and Cacioppo (1981) and Petty and Wegener (1998) for a formal 
discussion and review of the effect of repetition on target evaluation. Malaviya (2007) discusses the role of 
context in determining the impact of repetition, whereas Anand and Shachar (2004) study the role played by 
informational content. For a recent model by economists, see De Marzo, et al (2003).  
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2.c. Empirical Strategy 
We estimate a regression of the form  
 
Water Score Gap Gained Water President Vignette i i i ab
Gained Water  * President Vignette Personal Controls i i i i cd  
 
where Water Score Gapi is the difference between the score given to the water privatization 
minus the score given to all privatizations by person i, Gained Wateri is a dummy equal to 1 if 
person i gained water, President Vignettei is dummy equal to 1 if person i was read the vignette 
with the statements made by the President about the water company, and μi is an error term. 
Whenever President Vignettei is included in a regression, we also include Firm Vignettei which is 
the piece of information released by the company during these attacks (they are defined in 
the appendix; note that these vignettes are read to different sub-samples). This strategy helps 
by providing a benchmark of how information is affecting beliefs.
15 
 
While the construction of the variable  Gained Water was relatively straightforward once we 
obtained the maps of the city detailing the areas where there had been increases in water 
access, the empirical approach designed to capture the effect of propaganda was somewhat 
more challenging. We selected one of the statements made by the President, and constructed 
a  vignette  which  added  a  short  introduction  explaining  the  circumstance  in  which  the 
statement was made. Given that it is debatable what constitutes propaganda and what does 
not,  we  used  an  actual  statement  made  by  President  Kirchner  in  his  attempt  to  affect 
people‟s beliefs about the benefits of having privatized the water service. One characteristic 
of  the  statement  is  that  it  is  obviously  inaccurate  (the  facts  reported  are  demonstrably 
untrue).  A  second  characteristic  is  that  it  is  set  in  the  real  political  “market”,  an actual 
situation where propaganda was deemed useful (by an agent who has been successful in that 
market). Our hypothesis is that the short intervention will remind participants of a world-
view that had been extensively communicated to them in the media and that they might find 
                                                 
15 It also provides evidence on the standard tendency to agree with the interviewer.  
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plausible. The brevity of the intervention would presumably bias the results against finding 
an effect of propaganda.
16 
 
This statement was read during the interviews by the members of the survey company to 
one third of the respondents, after an introduction that explained that the investigation was 
carried by un iversity professors for academic purposes and was not financed by the 
government, any government organization or a private company. After a small initial set of 
questions, the interviewer said “Before continuing we want to read to you a piece of information recently 
appeared in the newspapers”. Then the interviewer read: 
  
“Information that recently appeared in the newspapers reflects serious problems in the 
quality of water in Lomas de Zamora. On March 9, 2006, President Kirchner cancelled 
by  decree  the  contract  of  Aguas  Argentinas.  In  its  decision  the  government  alleged 
problems with the quality of service as the main reason to re-nationalize the company. On 
repeated occasions, President Kirchner has criticized the company for lack of compliance 
of the terms of the concession contract and, more generally, for their performance since 
privatization.  Recently,  in  a  political  rally  in  Mar  de  Ajo,  he  stated:  “There  are 
companies, like Aguas Argentinas, that should acknowledge that what they did to us is 
shameful, because they have taken five thousand million dollars and did not even built 
two pipes” 
 
The interviewer then said, “returning to the survey, how would you evaluate…”. We constructed 
President Vignette, a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement and zero 
otherwise. In order to benchmark any potential tendency of the respondents to bias their 
answers to agree with the interviewer, we also provided a second vignette on this topic to 
another third of our sample. This time it reported what the company had said in response to 
the attacks of the president (Firm Vignette). See the appendix for all data definitions. 
 
One difficulty with this empirical strategy is that while one could potentially derive the cost 
to the company of affecting reality (by dividing the total investment costs to the company by 
the number of households connected to the water service), it is harder to put a price tag on 
                                                 
16 Iyengar et al (1982) administered tests one day after the final broadcast and find that their estimated effects 
survive for at least twenty-four hours. They note that the dissemination of television news is periodic, typically 
following cycles of twenty-four hours or less.  
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the propaganda campaign. This means that we do not provide a precise comparative analysis 
of  the  costs  of  changing  beliefs  through  a  propaganda  campaign  versus  an  investment 
campaign (reality). Instead, we focus on whether a political entrepreneur can change people‟s 
beliefs through a large propaganda campaign (containing patently untrue statements). And, 





Table  3  presents  the  basic  estimates  for  the  effect  of  investment  on  views  about 
privatization. The left hand side variable in column (1) is Water Score Gap, the difference 
between  the  score  given  to  the  water  privatizations  and  the  score  given  to  all  the 
privatizations, while the main right hand side variable is Gained Water, a dummy equal to 1 if 
the household gained water and sanitation during the privatization. Columns (2) and (3) in 
Table 3 include personal characteristics and municipality dummies, obtaining very similar 
results.
 17 The coefficients on personal characteristics are insignificant, confirming the benefit 
of employing the difference between scores as our dependent variable (instead of just the 
score for the water privatization; see also Table 2a). 
18, 19 
 
One  way  to  gauge  the  size  of  the  effect  is  to  note  that  the  average  score  given  to 
privatizations in general is 3.07, so that using the coefficient from column (1) we note that 
having received the benefit of a particular privatization (gained water) improves the score for 
the relevant privatization by almost 30% (0.91/3.07). An alternative benchmark is the score 
given to the water privatization by those that did not receive water. The average score it 
receives in this group is 3.35, so that receiving the benefits of firm investment (having gained 
water) improves the score just over 27%.  
                                                 
17 Although about only half of municipalities present within-municipality variability in Gained Water.  
18 The results of these regressions are qualitatively similar if we use Score Water Privatization as the dependent 
variable (instead of Water Score Gap). There are two main differences: some of the coefficients on the personal 
characteristics for which we have data are significant on some specifications; and the absolute size of the 
coefficient on the variable Gained Water changes across specifications. 
19 When data on a control is  missing, we impute a zero and then use  dummy variables to indicate this. This 
choice of using dummies to indicate missing observations for the controls, rather than reducing the sample 
when we do not have data on a particular personal characteristic of a respondent, reflects the fact that once  we 
focus on Water Score Gap, personal characteristics are no longer playing an important role. None of the results 




Table  4  introduces  the  effect  of  propaganda.  While  the  coefficient  on  Gained  Water  is 
unchanged, the coefficient on President Vignette is negative and significant at the 10% level in 
columns (1) and (2) and at the 5% level in column (3). The size of the effect is large: relative 
to the score that the water privatization receives by those that are not read any vignette, 
exposure to the government propaganda reduces the score by almost 16% (0.49/3.07). The 
effect of Firm Vignette is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
20 This suggests that the 
channel through which President Vignette affects beliefs is persuasion rather than the provision 
of information.  
 
Table  5  reports  the  effect  of  propaganda  at  different  levels  of  firm  investment.  The 
interaction term between No Water and President Vignette is significant at the 10% level. It is 
of approximately similar size, but with the opposite sign, to the coefficient on Gained Water, 
suggesting that the effect of propaganda is particularly strong on those that did not have 
first-hand experience  of the  firm‟s investment.  The large  size  of the  effect  suggests the 
following calculation: a firm that invests to provide water access to a household gains almost 
as much support by this action as it gains from ensuring that the household is not exposed 
to the propaganda of the political entrepreneur. Given our empirical design, we are unable to 
provide an estimate of how long lasting is this effect of exposure to propaganda. 
  
Table 6 replaces the dependent variable for the scores that other privatizations receive. Thus, 
in columns (1a), (2a) and (3a) we run the same regressions but use the difference between 
the score given to the privatization of the telephone company and the score given to all 
privatizations as the dependent variables (Telephones Score Gap). The results are insignificant 
and the patterns in the coefficients are quite different than those previously obtained. A 
similar picture emerges if we use the gap in the score given to the privatization of the oil 
company (Oil Company Score Gap) minus the score to all the privatizations in columns (1b), 
                                                 
20 Naturally, the coefficients for both vignettes are statistically the same if we use Score Water Privatization as the 
dependent  variable  (instead  of  Water  Score  Gap).  For  example,  without  including  any  control  variable,  the 
coefficient  (std.  error)  for  President  Vignette  is  -0.41  (0.25)  (significant  at  the  10%)  while  the  coefficient 
associated to Firm Vignette is -0.06 (0.25).  
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(2b) and (3b). These results suggest that a reasonable interpretation of our  Gained Water 
estimates in previous tables is causal.
21  
 
Tables 7 and 8 explore whether the estimated effects depend on ideological position, as 
suggested in the theoretical literature where prior beliefs affect the amount of updating. We 
use three indicators that might proxy for ideological predisposition to up date beliefs 
following the disclosure of evidence (in the form of firm investment) and accept persuasion 
efforts (in the form of government propaganda): income, extent of agreement with the idea 
that those that put in effort end up significantly better tha n those that do not (“American 
Dream”), and vote in the last presidential election before privatization. There do not seem to 
be strong patterns (although we note that several respondents did not report a vote in the 
1989 election, perhaps because it took place more than 16 years earlier or because of other 
factors). We conclude that, if such interactions between predisposition and propaganda exist, 





In this paper we study the effect of a large propaganda campaign by the government in the 
formation  of  beliefs  about  the  benefits  of  water  privatization  in  Argentina.  We  are 
concerned with two questions: Can a political entrepreneur persuade others of his/her views 
or are beliefs only affected by data learned through direct observation? And to what extent 
differences in “reality” affect the impact of propaganda?  
 
We approach the issue by conducting a survey after the government nationalized the water 
company in 2006 following a propaganda campaign in the media where it repeatedly pointed 
out the shortcomings of privatizing public utilities as well as criticize other market oriented 
policies  taken  during  the  1990‟s  by  a  previous  government.  We  implement  our  test  of 
propaganda  by  reading  a  sub-sample  of  subjects  a  negative  statement  about  the  water 
company  made  by  the  government  as  part  of  its  campaign  rallying  support  for  the 
nationalization. The statement alleged a total lack of investment on the part of the company 
                                                 
21 It suggests an informational channel and not just a mere-exposure effect (see, for example Zajonc, 1968).  
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and was demonstrably untrue. We then asked respondents their views about the benefits of 
privatizations. In order to get variation in “reality” we used city maps of water access to 
ensure that our sample contained two groups: one that gained access to water after the water 
company was privatized in 1993 and another group that never received access.  
 
A summary of the results is as follows: while negative opinions about the privatizations 
prevail,  these  are  particularly  strong  amongst  households  that  did  not  benefit  from  the 
privatization and amongst households that were reminded of the government‟s views about 
the privatization. A person‟s beliefs of the benefits of the water privatization (relative to 
other  privatizations)  were  almost  30%  more  negative  if  his/her  household  did  not  gain 
access to water after the privatization. Similarly, a person‟s view of the water privatization 
(relative to other privatizations) was 16% more negative if he/she was read a vignette with 
some of the negative statements about the water privatization that Argentina‟s President 
expressed during the re-nationalization process. Perhaps the most interesting result is that 
the effect of the vignette is large and significant amongst households that did not gain water 
during the privatization while it is insignificant amongst those that gained access.  
 
The interpretation of our results is straightforward. First, we find that propaganda can be 
effective in changing people‟s views. By design, our estimates reflect the role of persuasion 
rather than other influences (like agenda setting) because the piece of propaganda and the 
respondent‟s beliefs concern the same specific issue (whereas in studies focusing on how 
propaganda changes voting the estimates could reflect either channel). Second, we find that 
the effectiveness of propaganda depends on “reality”: people who have first-hand experience 
that contradicts the statements made by the President are unaffected by them. Those that do 
not have such experience are particularly susceptible to be affected by propaganda. This is 
consistent with models of persuasion predicting that individuals who have cheaper access to 
facts will be harder to persuade. More broadly, our results suggest heterogeneity in individual 
experiences (under privatization) allows political entrepreneurs the possibility of changing 




Our study has limitations. One that appears important is that we do not know how long 
these propaganda effects last.
22 Another problem is that even though having gained access to 
water improved people‟s opinion about the water privatization, it is still true that they were 
still quite negative amongst this group of middle and low income households. It is extremely 
unlikely that these would have gained access had the privatization not occurred (judging 
from  the  performance  of  the  water  company  before  the  privatization  or  since  the  re-
nationalization).
23 Thus, either people care about other aspects of the privatization beyond  
the purely material benefits emphasized by economists, or their views may only partially be 
affected by their experiences. For example,  the collapse of the macroeconomic program 
(which pegged the exchange rate) that was implemented together with the privatizations may 
be weighing on respondents minds, although such bundling of opinions does not occur 
naturally in rational models of belief formation. 
                                                 
22 The first in a series of pamphlets produced under Josef Goebbels‟ Reichspropaganda-Abteilung, the propaganda 
section of the Nazi Party, included a text (by G. Stark) explaining the connection between propaganda and 
beliefs: “Propaganda is by no means simply commercial advertising applied to the political, or spiritual arena. They seek only 
momentary effect, whereas political propaganda seeks the systematic enlightenment necessary to win supporters to a worldview.” 
from the German Propaganda Archive, accessed online on July 1st, 2008. 
23 Stokes (2001), Lora and Olivera (2007) document very low support for market reform in Latin America.    
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Figure 1: Evolution of water charges. The two entries for May 1993 correspond to before and after 








Figure 3: Sample of government statements against the water company 
January 28, 2005: La Nación newspaper.  
The President said: “I find it hard to believe how spoiled these companies have become, who sit and 
negotiate asking 60% increases in water.  „No way, Jose‟, we will allow them a raise! (Minga que les 
vamos a aumentar!). First, let them provide water to the people”, Kirchner said. “Come to work, to 
invest and generate jobs, don‟t just come seeking profits” 
 
July 28, 2005: Clarin newspaper 
During a speech at the Government House, the President said: “When one goes visiting different 
places, even though we have made lot of progress, how many people do not have access to water”. 
“To tell the truth”, he added, “one is moved that so close to the obelisk and the General Paz we can 
still find so many people that still cannot access drinkable water”. Kirchner then added that “the 
water concession companies should keep this type of thing very present”. And he then moved to a 
more menacing tone “We are not interested in having concession companies that do not fulfill 
services to the people. We want them to fulfill the services to the people and they will have to fulfill 
because we are going to take all the actions that are necessary and the roads that are necessary”. 
 
September 16, 2005: La Nación newspaper  
The President even wants the Minister of Federal Planning, Julio De Vido, to invite the executives 
from Suez to make their announcement and leave the country, his collaborators explained. “If they 
want to leave, let them leave. They run a business that many other firms are interested”. 
 
October 13, 2005: Clarin newspaper.  
Kirchner, on Tuesday, during a political rally in Mar de Ajo, attacked hard the water concession 
company,  whose  European  shareholders  (Suez,  Aguas  de  Barcelona,  Anglian  and  Vivendi) 
announced  their  intention  to  cancel  the  concession  contract.  “There  are  companies,  like  Aguas 
Argentinas, that should acknowledge that what they did to us is shameful, because they have taken 
five thousand million dollars and did not even build two pipes” said the president. 
 
February 22, 2006: La Nación newspaper 
During an act in Ezeiza, Kirchner questioned the work of the company, controlled by the French 
group Suez, which at present is looking for a buyer that would take over the water concession 
contract, “How could it be that there are districts in Argentina, such as the case of La Matanza, 
where only 20 percent of the population has water?”, the president asked himself. “That is what that 
company did, Aguas Argentinas, that is beating around the bush so much”, he added in reference to 
Suez‟s unresolved exit.    
 
March 22, 2006: La Nación newspaper 
Minister De Vido accused Aguas Argentinas of not having fulfilled with the agreed plan for works on 
the expansion and improvement of the service, and of “endangering the health of the population”. 
Kirchner rated the service that was provided by the company as “terrible”, and assured that the 
cancellation of the contract brought an end to “an insult and an injustice” and that “water will once 
again be a social good”. He also attacked the executives directly. “They have been in Argentina for 15 
years, they took away hundreds of millions of dollars in profits and we have to beg to get a drop of 
water.  Enough,  now,  we  the  Argentines,  we  will  construct  destiny  as  it  should  be  done”,  he 






Figure 3 continued: Sample of government statements against the water company 
 
March 23, 2006: La Nación newspaper 
“I have a lot of respect for the people of France, for the French nation and for President Chirac, but 
let it be clear that I am not willing, in order to get the visit of a President or so that the Foreign 
Ministry is happy, to lower my eyes and allow the contamination of the water that the Argentines 
drink, under no circumstance. I think the health of the Argentines is central and fundamental”, said 
Kirchner during the presentation of the National Book Plan in Martinez. 
 
March 23, 2006: La Nación newspaper  
Prosecutor Guillermo Daneri requested that the federal justice grant the “prohibition to exit the 
country of Jean Bernard Lemire, Alain Chaigneau, Carlos de Royere and Conrado Bianchi” in the 
context of the charges made by the mayor of Lomas de Zamora against Suez on account of the 
“extremely high levels of nitrates” in the water provided by the company to the inhabitants of that 
district of Buenos Aires. … The Planning Minister was put in charge of announcing the cancellation 
of the concession contract last Tuesday and the creation of a new water company. … Meanwhile the 
Interior Minister, Aníbal Fernández, requested “explanations from those responsible” in the French 
group Suez because “in the area of Lomas de Zamora more than 73 milligrams of nitrate per liter in 
the water network and almost 145 milligrams in the perforations”, while “in France, from where this 
company is originally, there cannot be more than 45 milligrams per liter”. “The naive always pay so 
as to resolve the profits of the companies and in Argentina the time has come to say things by their 
own name”, said Fernandez to Radio Rivadavia, about the government‟s decision to cancel the water 




TABLE 1a: Average Score for the Reforms across samples with and without Water 
  All  Gained Water  No Water 
       



















Note:  Each  cell  presents  the  average  value  of  the  variables  listed  in  each  row,  for  the  sample 








TABLE 1b: Average Score for the Reforms across samples with Vignettes 
  All  President  Vignette  Firm Vignette 
       



















Note:  Each  cell  presents  the  average  value  of  the  variables  listed  in  each  row,  for  the  sample 






TABLE 2a: Sample Characteristics: Water vs No Water Samples 





Gained Water  









       




- 2.12 ** 



















- 3.58 *** 
Note: Gained (No) Water is the sub-sample that did (did not) gain water during the privatization. 
 
 






























           




- 0.77  - 0.019 
(0.040) 
- 0.49 




0.93  0.025 
(0.039) 
0.64 




- 1.43  - 5.009 
(1.554) 
- 3.2 *** 




1.07  0.556 
(1.088) 
0.51 




- 0.59  0.016 
(0.047) 
0.34 








TABLE 3: Water Privatization Score and Reality (Firm Investment) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


























        
Municipality Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
       
Sample Size  535  535  535 
 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). The dependent 
variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all 
privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the 
privatization. Omitted category is No Water. In Columns (2) and (3) we impute a zero when there is a 





TABLE 4: Water Privatization Score, Reality and Propaganda 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















       
Individual Controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
       
Sample Size  535  535  535 
 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis).  The dependent 
variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all 
privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the 
privatization.  Government  (Firm)  Vignette  is  a  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  household  was  read  the 
government (firm) vignette. Individual controls include skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a 
dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household. Omitted category is 
No Water. In Columns (2) and (3) we impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal 








TABLE 5: Water Privatization Score, Reality-Propaganda Interactions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






























       
Individual Controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
       
Sample Size  535  535  535 
 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis). The dependent 
variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all 
privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the 
privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government 
(firm) vignette. Individual controls include skill, age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy 
equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household. Omitted category is No Water. 
In Columns (2) and (3) we impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and 
then include a dummy variable to indicate this. 
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TABLE 6: Other Privatization Scores, with Water Investment and Propaganda 
 
Dependent 
Variable:  Telephone Score Gap  Oil Company Score Gap 
  (1a)  (2a)  (3a)  (1b)  (2b)  (3b) 













Vignette    - 0.26 
(0.18)      - 0.02 
(0.19)   
Firm Vignette    0.02 
(0.19)      0.18 




    - 0.19 
(0.26)      0.21 
(0.28) 
Firm Vignette * 
Gained Water      0.23 
(0.26)      0.32 
(0.28) 
President 
Vignette * No 
Water 
    -0.32 
(0.26)      - 0.23 
(0.27) 
Firm Vignette * 
No Water      - 0.19 
(0.26)      0.04 
(0.28) 
             
Sample Size  532  532  532  532  532  532 
 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (standard errors in parenthesis), which includes 
individual  controls  and  municipality  fixed  effects.  The  dependent  variable  in  columns  (1a-3a)  is 
Telephones  Score  Gap,  the  score  given  to  the telephone  privatization  minus the  score  given  to  all 
privatizations, while in columns (1b-3b) it is Oil Score Gap, the score given to the privatization of the 
national oil company minus the score given to all privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 
if the household gained access to water during the privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the household was read the government (firm) vignette. Individual controls include skill, 
age, a socioeconomic score index and a dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head 
of the household. Omitted category is No Water. We impute a zero when there is a missing value for 
the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate this. 
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TABLE 7: Propaganda at different levels of income, prior beliefs and voting  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 


















President Vignette * High Income  -0.48 
(0.47)     
Firm Vignette * High Income  0.16 
(0.45)     
President Vignette * Effort Pays    0.04 
(0.40)   
Firm Vignette * Effort Pays    - 0.41  
(0.40)   
President Vignette * Voted Menem      -0.43 
(0.39) 
Firm Vignette * Voted Menem      0.45 
(0.40) 
       
Sample Size  508  516  484 
 
Note:  Each  column  is  a  separate  OLS  regression  (standard  errors  in  parenthesis).  All  include 
municipality  fixed  effects  and  individual  controls  (skill,  age,  a  socioeconomic  score  index  and  a 
dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household). The dependent 
variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all 
privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the 
privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government 
(firm) vignette. High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent‟s socioeconomic score index was 
over the median. Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that those that put in 
effort end up much better or considerably better than those who do not put in effort (and zero if the 
think slightly better or the same). Voted Menem is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted for 
Carlos Menem in the 1989 presidential election. Omitted category is the group that was not read any 
vignette. We impute a zero when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a 
dummy variable to indicate this. 
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TABLE 8: Investment at different levels of Income, prior beliefs and voting 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






President Vignette  - 0.53 * 
(0.27) 
- 0.47 * 
(0.27) 
- 0.49 * 
(0.28) 






Gained Water * High Income  0.29 
(0.40)     
Gained Water * Effort Pays    0.36 
(0.37)   
Gained Water * Voted Menem      0.01 
(0.34) 
       
       
Sample Size  508  516  484 
 
Note:  Each  column  is  a  separate  OLS  regression  (standard  errors  in  parenthesis).  All  include 
municipality  fixed  effects  and  individual  controls  (skill,  age,  a  socioeconomic  score  index  and  a 
dummy equal to 1 when the survey respondent was the head of the household). The dependent 
variable is Water Score Gap, the score given to the water privatization minus the score given to all 
privatizations. Gained Water is a dummy equal to 1 if the household gained access to water during the 
privatization. President (Firm) Vignette is a dummy equal to 1 if the household was read the government 
(firm) vignette. High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent‟s socioeconomic score index was 
over the median. Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that those that put in 
effort end up much better or considerably better than those who do not put in effort (and zero if 
they report slightly better or the same). Voted Menem is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted 
for Carlos Menem in the 1989 presidential election. Omitted category is No Water. We impute a zero 
when there is a missing value for the personal controls and then include a dummy variable to indicate 
this.   31 
Description of the Variables 
 
Score Reforms 90s: The answer to the question “On a scale from 1 to 10, what score would you give to 
the market reforms implemented during the 1990’s?” 
 
Score Privatizations: The answer to the question “On a scale from 1 to 10, what score would you give 
to the privatization of state-owned companies?” 
 
Score Water Privatization: The answer to the question “On a scale from 1 to 10, what score would you 
give to the privatization of the water company?”. This question was asked after the vignettes 
were read (when household were randomly assigned to vignettes). 
 
Water Score Gap: Score Water Privatization minus Score Privatizations. 
 
Gained Water: A dummy equal to 1 if the household gained connection to the water service 
after the 1993 privatization (and zero otherwise).  
 
No Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was not read any statements (and zero 
otherwise). 
 
President Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement below (and 
zero otherwise):  
 
Information that recently appeared in the newspapers discusses serious problems in the quality of 
water in Lomas de Zamora. 
 
On March 9, 2006, President Kirchner cancelled by decree the contract of Aguas Argentinas. In its 
decision the government alleged problems with the quality of service as the main reason to re-
nationalize the company. On repeated occasions, President Kirchner has criticized the company 
for lack of compliance of the terms of the concession contract and,  more  generally,  for their 
performance since privatization.  
 
Recently, in a political rally in Mar de Ajo, he stated: 
 
“There are companies, like Aguas Argentinas, that should acknowledge that what they did to us is 
shameful, because they have taken five thousand million dollars and did not even built two pipes” 
 
 
Firm Vignette: A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was read the statement below (and zero 
otherwise): 
  
The company Aguas Argentinas, which was responsible for water services in the Greater Buenos 
Aires area, has published information regarding the amount of investment made since privatization 
in 1993. These investments have allowed the company to: 
 
  Increase the population with access to drinkable water by 2 million people (from 5.5 
million to 7.5 million between 1993 and 2004) 
  Increase  the  population  with  access  to  sewage  and  sanitation  services  by  1.2  million 
people (from 4.7 million to 5.9 million between 1993 and 2004) 
  Increase  the  pressure  in  the  water  network,  reduce  shortage  cuts  during  summer  and 
improve water muddiness.    32 
  Improve other aspects of water quality, although recently in some areas served by Aguas 
Argentinas high levels of nitrates have been found –for example in Lomas de Zamora  
 
The company also explained that the average  water charge for residential customers  of 25,81 
pesos bimonthly, equivalent to 43 cents per day, is one of the lowest in Latin America. However, 
since the devaluation of the peso and the end of Convertibility in January 2002, the company has 
been requesting an increase in the tariff. The lack of agreement with the government over this 
issue has ended with the re-nationalization of the company. 
 
Unskilled (=1): A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is unskilled (and 
zero otherwise). The unskilled are those reporting an education level below high 
school completed. 
 
Semi-Skilled (=1): A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is semi-skilled 
(and zero otherwise). The semi-skilled are those reporting completed high school, 
completed tertiary and incomplete tertiary-university education. 
 
Age: The age (in years) of the household head. 
 
Socioeconomic  Index  Score:  The  score  for  the  socioeconomic  index  of  the  household,  as 
described in Argentine Marketing Association (1998). 
 
HH is Respondent (=1): A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the household head is the 
person responding the survey (and zero otherwise). 
 
Score Telephone Privatization: The answer to the question “On a scale from 1 to 10, what score would 
you give to the privatization of the telephone company?” 
 
Telephone Score Gap: Score Telephone Privatization minus Score Privatizations. 
 
Score Oil Company Privatization: The answer to the question “On a scale from 1 to 10, what score 
would you give to the privatization of the national oil company?” 
 
Oil Company Score Gap: Score Oil Company Privatization minus Score Privatizations. 
 
High Income is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent‟s socioeconomic score index was over 
the median (and zero otherwise).  
 
Effort Pays is a dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question “In general, do you believe that 
people who make an effort working end up, 1) much better than those who did not put in effort, 2) 
quite a bit better off, 3) a bit better off or 4) just about the same as those that did not put in an 
effort?”,  was either 1) or 2) and zero if the answer was 3) or 4).  
 
Voted  Menem  is  a  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  respondent  says  that  s/he  voted  for  Carlos 
Menem, the president who implemented the market reforms of the 1990‟s, in the 
1989 presidential election (and zero otherwise).    33 
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